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More than a half century ago, in 1914, our legislature became
an early subscriber to the then newfangled workmen's compen-
sation scheme that was just catching the fancy of social reform-
ers. In fact, Louisiana and Texas were the first states in the
South to adopt statutes of this kind. Workmen's compensation
had been declared invalid under the equal protection clause only
two years earlier by the highly prestigious Court of Errors and
Appeals in New York.' For this reason those states which ven-
tured into workmen's compensation during this early period
did so hesitantly and only after the lawmakers had limited the
areas within which the new statutes would apply so that con-
stitutional problems hopefully would be avoided. In Louisiana
(and in several other states during the same period) the idea
of restricting workmen's compensation to hazardous businesses
suggested a sustainable basis for classification in the expected
event that the acts would be challenged in the courts. Accord-
ingly, private employers were covered under the statute only if
they were engaged in some hazardous business.2 The lack of
any compelling social or economic basis to support a limitation
of this kind is betrayed by the fact that the legislature afforded
general coverage for all employees of the state itself and its
political subdivisions without reference to whether the opera-
tions in which they were engaged were or were not hazardous.
Three years later the United States Supreme Court put to
rest all doubt concerning the constitutionality of workmen's
compensation schemes, including even those statutes which were
wholly unrestricted in their coverage of businesses.8 It might
be expected that the disappearance of constitutional objection
would have promptly induced the Louisiana Legislature to
am6nd the new statute so as to remove all hazardous business
limitations. This, however, was not done, and the compensation
measure today remains subject to about the same limits as in
1914. The only concession of the legislature was a provision in
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
2. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950).
3. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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1958 to the effect that workmen's compensation insurers are
denied the right to interpose the non-hazardous character of the
insured's business as a defense to a compensation claim.4 This
was a major step forward in view of the fact that most Louisi-
ana employers carry insurance protection. At the same time,
however, the amendment serves in a sense to highlight the sheer
artificiality of the restriction.
Faced with a limitation that was poorly grounded in policy
but which, if literally applied, could severely cripple the com-
pensation scheme, the courts managed over the years to spawn
a series of interpretations of the restriction to hazardous busi-
nesses which had the effect of working a significant enlargement
of coverage. The elaborate body of jurisprudence that evolved
in this state to deal with the qualification of hazardousness has
been described elsewhere,5 and it is sufficient here merely to
observe that any business whose employees are required to work
in proximity to machinery and electricity are likely to fall
within the coverage of the compensation scheme. The possi-
bilities for expanding coverage through this device were un-
limited. What supermarket, for instance, lacks a mechanized
meat slicer or at least an electric cash register? Where is the
office without an electric adding machine or typewriter; where
is the boarding house whose floors are not swept by a vacuum
cleaner? Add to these the myriad uses of automobiles (ma-
chines) in the conduct of every business, and it can be seen that
in this way coverage can be expanded virtually without limit.
But dependence upon such artifices is certain to spawn awkward
and unrealistic decisions. Of these there have been many. For
instance, a beauty parlor operator on a luxury liner enjoyed
compensation when the motion of the vessel caused her to roll
off the chaise lounge on deck where she was enjoying the sun.
Her job, said the court, was hazardous because the vessel itself
was a machine!7 But at the same time a manual worker who
sustained a rupture while hoisting a heavy load onto a truck
belonging, not to his employer, but to his employer's customer,
was denied compensation benefits because the employer's busi-
4. LA. R.S. 23:1166 (Supp. 1958).
5. W. MALONm], LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPBNSATION LAW & PRAcTicE §
91-103 (1951).
6. Id. § 97.
7. Rosenquist v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 78 So.2d 225 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1955).
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ness did not meet the requirement of being hazardous." All this,
understandably, has been a source of dispute within the courts.
The most recent illustration of differences among the judges
concerning the proper approach is Fontenot v. J. Weingarten,
Inc.9 The claimant, a clerk in a grocery store, sustained an in-
jury through strain while preparing a display of canned goods-
work which was conceded to be non-hazardous according to
previous decisions. The same clerk, however, frequently oper-
ated an electric cash register and conveyor counter (a moving
belt upon which customers deposit their goods while checking
out). The issue before the supreme court was whether such
innocuous machines and gadgets as those suggested above serve
to bring under the statute businesses which are otherwise non-
hazardous. This was a matter upon which the courts of appeal
had differed for more than a decade.10 The majority opinion by
Chief Justice McCaleb gave an affirmative answer. The opinion
observed that there is no basis in the statute for distinguishing
between various kinds of electrical and mechanical apparatus
in terms of the respective degree of danger involved in each
instance. It is noteworthy that the opinion noted specifically
that the claimant "regularly and frequently" came into contact
with the machines in question. This observation indicated that
the court is not yet prepared to disturb the limitation imposed
by it thirty years ago in Brownfield v. Southern Amusement
Co."1 to the effect that a claimant injured while doing non-haz-
ardous work must be prepared to show that his hazardous duties
in proximity to machinery constitute a substantial part of his
work routine.
Throughout the opinion there are indications that the court
may be inclined in an appropriate case to reconsider its basic
approach to the entire hazardous business limitation as it ap-
pears in the statute. The majority opinion, although conceding
that there is jurisprudence to the effect that a grocery store is
not a hazardous business, continued, "but we are not so certain
8. Fields v. General Cas. Co. of America, 36 So.2d 843 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1948). See also Hammer v. Lazarone, 87 So.2d 765 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1956) (busboy in drive-in restaurant denied compensation).
9. 259 La. 217, 249 So.2d 886 (1971).
10. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICEI §§
97 & 101 (1951, Supp. 1964).
11. 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
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that that jurisprudence is any longer applicable to the expanded
'supermarket' chain-store type of operation."'1
Even more indicative of the court's readiness to reconsider
the entire matter is the special concurring opinion of Justice
Barham. He indicates a dissatisfaction with the accepted practice
of resorting to "hazardous features," and advocates instead a
straightforward determination by the court whether or not the
work done by the employee in the particular case is hazardous
in fact. "Heavy lifting, climbing, exposure to excessive heat,
and numerous other duties should be declared to be hazardous
work or hazardous features of employment in a non-hazardous
trade." 8
The tenuous character of the hazardous business limitation
as recognized by the courts invites complications in other areas
as well. For more than a quarter of a century the Louisiana
supreme court has adhered to the position that the proprietor
of a non-hazardous business does not subject himself to com-
pensation liability by reason of the fact that he directs an em-
ployee to repair or otherwise alter the premises upon which the
business is conducted. The commonly announced reason for this
exclusion is that repair and alteration are not parts of the trade
and/or business of the employer.14 It follows that repairs on
premises held by the employer for rental purposes or as security
for loans to customers do not constitute work covered by the
statute, and this is true even in face of the fact that repair op-
erations of this kind are clearly of a hazardous character. In
striking contrast is repair or improvement work done on struc-
tures owned and operated by the proprietor who is engaged in
a business that in some way can be characterized independently
as hazardous. Thus, fortunate indeed is the handyman who re-
pairs his employer's motion picture theater, which houses an
electric projector, 15 or his cattle yard or his undertaking parlor
(businesses that use motor trucks or motor propelled hearses),16
for he shall have compensation if injured, while the repair man
12. Fontenot v. Weingarten, Inc., 259 La. 217, 223, 249 So.2d 886, 888
(1971).
13. Id. at 239, 249 So.2d at 889.
14. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE §
102 (1951).
15. Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So.2d 824 (1952).
16. Gallien v. Judge, 28 So.2d 101 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); Hecker v.
Betz, 172 So. 816 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
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who meets with an accident while doing work on premises main-
tained for rental by a landlord is not so fortunate, and must pay
his own accident costs because the renting of property is not a
hazardous occupation. This strange position was reaffirmed last
year in Doss v. American Ventures, Inc.17 The disastrous effect
for the worker, however, was avoided by excluding the facts of
the controversy from the proposition announced above. The de-
fendant had been the owner of rental premises which had been
virtually destroyed by Hurricane Betsy. He had undertaken to
rebuild the structure on his own account, using only specialty
sub-contractors. One of these was the plaintiff, a painter, who
was injured while at work on this job. Relying upon the fact
that the rebuilding of the structure was a sizeable enterprise, the
court concluded that the owner of the destroyed building had
undertaken to engage in construction as a business. This was
true even though this single reconstruction was the only enter-
prise in which he engaged. 18
COMPENSATION AWARD FOR Loss OF AN EYE
The variety of the bases upon which a compensation award
may be supported under the Louisiana statute is well illustrated
by the instance of the accidental loss of an eye. Even the partial
loss of the vision of one eye alone can result in an award of total
disability if this handicap prevents the worker from performing
the duties of his former occupation.19 On the other hand, the
loss of an eye which does not result in any disabilty whatsoever
may nevertheless serve as the basis for an award of compensa-
tion for one hundred weeks under the schedule of specific
losses.20 As one court has expressed the matter, the schedule "is
not strictly compensatory, but is in the nature of a tort remedy
for a personal injury not affecting earning capacity or ability
to work."2' 1 Again, the same schedule concludes with an omni-
bus provision for serious permanent disfigurement "about the
face or head."22
17. 261 La. 920, 261 So.2d 615 (1972).
18. Cf. Locken v. Department of Labor & Indus., 58 Wash. 2d 534, 364
P.2d 232 (1961) (single land clearing operation for few days duration con-
stitutes a business); In re Karos, 34 Wyo. 357, 243 P. 593 (1926) (professional
plasterer undertook to transport a house for another on a single occasion,
held engaged in business of moving).
19. Knispel v. Gulf States Util. Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
20. LA. R.S. 23:1221(4)(i) (1950).
21. Wilson v. Union Indem. Co., 150 So. 309, 312 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
22. IA. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p) (1950).
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The several coverage provisions above were all before the
court recently in a situation involving a worker who, even
prior to the accident in question, was possessed of only bare
"motion vision" at best.2 (He could see motion of an object 14
to 16 inches away from his eye but could not identify the ob-
ject.) The accidental injury for which he now seeks compensa-
tion produced complete blindness in that eye, and it was there-
after necessary to remove it and substitute an artificial orb. The
worker had returned to his job, and his initial claim for total
disability was abandoned. The question before the court was
whether the loss of a virtually useless eye could be regarded as
one that falls within the schedule of specific losses. The opinion
suggested that coverage for the loss of an eye could be afforded
even though the organ was conceded to be utterly useless pre-
viously. This conclusion appears to be consonant with the ac-
cepted approach on specific losses in Louisiana. However, the
award of compensation for one hundred weeks was not rested
on this provision alone. The loss was considered a disfigurement
even though previous to the accident most of the iris or colored
portion of the eye had become white due to the presence of scar
tissue. The substitution of an artificial orb at least presented a
wholly different type of esthetic offensiveness from that which
attended the earlier condition.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
AD VALOREm TAXEs
The field of ad valorem taxes accounted directly for four
cases in the court term and indirectly for another. In the latter
category' Act 155 of 1970, establishing three tax assessors for
Jefferson Parish, was held violative of Louisiana Constitution
article XIV, § 9, which provides for a tax assessor to be elected by
each parish. The court in a rather interesting and to some extent
droll discussion of the meaning of "a" as "one," or "at least one"
or "any" concluded that on the basis of the totality of the
Constitution, "a" in this instance meant "one" and affirmed the
23. Landry v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 258 La. 649, 247 So.2d 564 (1971).
$ Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton
Rouge Bar.
1. Chehardy v. Democratic Executive Comm., 259 La. 45, 249 So.2d 196
(1971).
